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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE M. BECK, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DUTCHMAN COALITION MINES CO., 
Respondent and Cross-A.pp·ellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AND CR,OSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
8011 
The general statement of the Appellant on page 1 
of his ·brief does not mention the fact that the Defendant 
filed a cross-appe·al (R. 50). 
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The brief of appellant emphasizes the testin1ony 
of the Plaintiff Beck and attempts to abstract it rather 
completely. It is natural that the Appellant should 
minin1ize the testimony in behalf of the Respondent: 
but it seems necessary to an1plify the statement of the 
facts somevvhat, by referring to the cross-examination 
of the Appellant's witnesses and the testi1nony of RP-
spondent 's \Yitnesses a little niore completely. 
It must be borne in 1nind that the v~rdict of thr 
jury gave to the Appellant $1,500 by 111eans of ans,ver8 
to special interrogatories and that th~ Appellant seek~ 
to overturn this verdict. The test of this must be 'vhether 
any substantial evidence supports the verdict of the 
jury-and this evidence is to be found on behalf of the 
Respondent and not primarily in the direct te~ti1nony 
of the Appellant and his \vitnesses. 
Mr. Benjarnin L. Rich testified generally as ab-
stracted on page 20 of Appellant's brief on direct exami-
nation. The brief then says: ''On cross-exa1nination, 
Mr. Rich gave his opinion as to the value of the various 
· parts of the services rendered by the Plaintiff.'' 
Mr. Rich and Mr. Van Dam were called after they 
had heard only the testimony of Mr. Beck on direet 
examination, the Court pointing out the limitation on 
the value of their testimony at that point, \\Tithout the 
benefit of cross-examination (R. 231). It was necessar)· 
for. Mr. Rich to assume the facts as testified to by l\1 r. 
Beck (R. 232). Mr. Rich testified that he \\'onld charge 
$2,000 for the services rendered by Mr. Beck in 1951 
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dissuading nir. Gottron from bringing an action, based 
upon his understanding that Gottron otherwise would 
·have filed the suit and that Beck pursuaded him not to 
(R. 233). He also testified, as to the- laches of Mr. Beck 
in bringing his action: "'Except if it had been my mat-
ter, my case, I '\vould have collected as I went along, 
but that '\Vas not done * * * . Because I do not think it 
vvould be good practice to let an account of this char-
acter, for attorney -fees, run for 30 years," (R. 234). 
He also testifed that in his opinion money became due 
J1r. Beck for each item of service performed, unless the 
talk about Mr. Beck being paid ''when the company is 
in a position to declare a dividend" altered that, and 
as to this, it was his opinion that if the company had 
money to pay the salary of Mr. Holden, then Mr. Beck 
was equally entitled to his money at that time and 
''Mr. Beck should have been paid as he -vvent along.'' 
(R. 235). .l\fr. Rich regarded as delicate the represen-
tation by Mr. Beck, if it should be established, of Dutch-
man Mines Coalition Company, and also the sub-lessees 
(R. 238-239). 
- Mr. Rich would have charged from $1,000 to $1,500 
for handling of the Golden West Ejectn1ent suit and 
from $500 to $750 for preparing Articles of Incorpora-
tion, By-Laws, and original minutes (R. 240), and he 
would have charged $5,000 or $6,000 for legal work on 
patenting the four ·claims (R. 242). 
l\fr. Rich testified that the parties by agreement 
could effectively establish a lesser value for any of these 
serviees, that different la,vyers have different ra.tes of 
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charges, and that settlement of services on a particular 
item on an agreed basis might be assumed to establish 
the rate of compensation for future services (R. 242-
243). 
1\tfr. Van Dam testified on cross-examination that 
the companies he represen~ed had very substantial reYe-
nues as compared to the record of the Dutchman Conl-
pany and that the rate of pay for legal services is altered 
so1newhat by the ability of the client to pay (R. 2-1-7). 
1\tfr. Van Dan1 refused to express any opinion as to the 
value of the particular portions of the services rendered 
by Mr. Beck (R. 249). 
In connection \vith the abstract of Mr. Beck's testi-
n1ony, \Ve have examined the correspondence and point 
out that the correspondence does not support 1\fr. Beck's 
state1nents about the work done each year. F'or in~ tanre, 
at page 14, the brief states that Mr. Beck had extensiYe 
negotiations 'vi th Mr. Cleghorn concerning the use of 
equip1nent at the mine. The letters in Exhibit RR 1nake 
no mention of such a fact. It cannot be assmued that 
the correspondence contained in these numerous exhibits 
supports the testimony of Mr. Beck and the ('OrreBponrl-
ence itself has not been abstracted in Appellant's brief. 
On cross-examination, in addition to and in amplifi-
cation of, the abstract contained at page 21-2:) of .\ pp(~l­
lant's Brief, Mr. Beck testified that his serviet~~ prior 
to incorporation of the Respondent's corporation Wt\rP 
not included in the action, although Mr. BP('k would 
expect the aetion to in(·lude servi('es in a forP<'losun· 
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action prior to the incorp,oration (R. 250). Mr. Beck 
testified that he had no .written agreement covering 
compensation for his legal services (R. 256) and that he 
had asked for money for surveys but had n1ade no demand 
prior to 1946 for payn1ent of his services in full and 
knew of no instance \\There he had aske·d for any specific 
item of expense \vhich had not been paid (R. 256.). 
In a letter of July 9, 1944, which is Exhibit l, Mr. 
Holden advised Mr. Beck that the valuation on the capi-
tal stock should be $100,000 allowing a profit of $8,000 
for the year Hand I an1 not optimistic enough to hope 
for more than that" (R. 267) and Mr. Holden rep·orted 
to ~fr. Beck on October 30, 19·46, that royalties reeeived 
since "last J tme" totaled $6,776.17 (R. 267). 
On 11:arch 13, 1947, Beck advised Mr. I-Iolden that 
the mine should gross $2,000 a day for the next 90 days 
and a letter of April 28, 1947, from Mr. Beck to Mr. 
Holden states that 52 tons of ore were produced in one 
day and that frorn then to July would be a race to get all 
the ore possible out of the mine (R. 268). 
Another letter fro1n ~1r. Beck to Mr. Holden dated 
December 16, 1944, referre·d in detail to the net smelter. 
returns received (R. 269). 
A letter (Exhibit FF) by Mr. Beck to Mr. Holden 
dated June 14, 1926, states that he had sp·ent considerable 
tilne working on the patents "but I am not charging for 
this time as this matter has been extremely unfortunate" 
but when asked whether he was now seeking to charge 
for those se-rvi·ces in this· action, Mr. Beck replied, 
"absolutely" (R. 276-277). 
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In reference to the Golden \V. est ejectment suit, ~Ir. 
B'eck also referred to his letter of June 19, 194-±, in 'vhich 
he said "I acknowledge your check in full payment of 
compensation" and he then testified that he was making 
a clai1n for those services in this action, since "I \\·as 
not charging for tin1e in that ease, I don't think I even 
charged for the pleadings" (R .. 283) and then testified 
that he had nothing in writing to contradict the state-
n1ent in his letter that the check was payment in full for 
the Golden WeRt action. 
vVith reference to the 20,000 shares of stock trans-
ferred to Mr. Beck in 1937, he testified that he received 
certificate Nos. 72 and 73 for 10,000 shares each shortly 
after October 25, 1937 (R.. 285) and that he paid no 
cash for the stock and paid nothing for it ''unless just 
work" and had never tendered the stock back to the 
company as having been improperly issued (R. 285-
286). He assumed that the stock was to be offset against 
what the company owed him (R. 288-289). 
The minutes at page 38 and 42 of Exhibit B were 
read to Mr. Beck (R. 285) and Mr. Beck admitted that 
the minute book was brought to him in 1938, and was 
exhibited to him, but testified he knew nothing about thP 
minutes concerning the stock until the Inatter \\·as dis-
cussed at pre-trial of this case- (R. 293). 
Beck admitted that Mr. Heist 'vas hired and paid 
by Mr. Bourne in 1939 and 19·40 (R. 295-296). 
Mr. Beck related a conservation with Mr. Holden 
in the fall of 1946 or 1947, as follows: 
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~'Q. Did it take place in your office~ 
A. I remember why I said what I did~ very 
distinctly. 
Q. \V.ill you relate the conservation as you 
recall it~ 
.. A.. Yes, but I want an opportunity later to 
explain it. Yes, I will relate it. Harry came to 
me and he said that, 'We are going along pretty 
good, and we "\vant to get all of the bills paid, and 
"\Ve want to get ready to declare a dividend' and he 
said, 'We want to get settled up with you, 
finally.' " 
"'Then for the first time in the whole 30 years 
he put this in, 'I lmow, Clarence, you are going to 
be reasonable. I know you will he reasonable. You 
won't charge too much,' and that is where the 
first suspicion came up. I immediately started-
! will confess-! immediately started to wonder, 
and as I remember, this was close to the tax year, 
and I did say I would rather we would settle up 
next year. But I \Vas very shocked about this 
'n1odest and reasonable fee'" (R. 299-300)." 
By reference to Exhibits 5 and 6 this conversation 
was fixed as occuring in 1946 (R. 300). Exhibit 5 was 
dated August 6, 1947, was produced from the files of 
Mr. Beck and was a letter addressed to him by Mr. 
Holden. Mr. Holden reminded Mr. Beck of the request 
for a bill and insisted that it be sent saying: "It may be 
best to delay any further legal expense until this matter 
is cleared up" and again requested Beck's state~ent "as 
when I tried to get it from you last year, you put it off 
on account of your taxes" (R. 302-303). 
~f r. Beck testified that the expenses on his trips to 
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Chicago subsequent to 1947, were ·paid by a Los Angele~ 
syndicate of which Mr. Holden was not a part (R. 306). 
Mr. Beck acknowledged sending Exhibit ll to J1r. 
I-Iolden on February 10, 1945, in which he discussed 
negotiations with Combined 1\Ietals Company and said. 
"I did not kno'v until I had spent a lot of time on the 
deal that it was another deal, until you informed 1ne, 
beeause I only had authority to deal in behalf of the 
majority stockholders of the leasing company, and this. 
of course, is the only way the Dutchman Co1npany can 
wiggle out no,v," (R. 321) and testified that in the event 
of success in that deal he vv-ouldn't have to look to Booth 
and Gardner for payn1ent, but if they had given hin1 
something he vvouldn't have turned it down (R. 223) and 
that he never advised Mr. Holden that he intended to hold 
the Dutchrnan Company for his time and services in 
that matter (R. 324). 
Mr. Beck testified that the largest file in his office 
.is the file of Willard Cleghorn and that on May 24, 
1947, he advised Nlr. Holden by letter that Co1nbined 
Metals R.eduction Company had offered him an extra-
ordinarily good deal (R. 326). This transaction was 
beneficial to both Mr. Cleghorn and the Dutchman Com-
pany and Mr. Beck testified that this service was sub-
stantial to both, that he did not charge Mr. Cleghorn 
for the services and did not advise Mr. Holden that he 
was looking to the Dutchman Company for pay1nent 
(R. 326-327). He gave the san1e testimon~T r.oncerning 
negotiations with the Rio (}rande Railway in a lettrr in 
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April, 1947, to 1lr. Holden (R. 327 -328). Mr. Beck testi-
fied to some services connected with an RF·C Loan 
obtained by the Lessees of the Dutchman Mine and that 
he was attempting to hold the Dutchman Company for 
those services but had never advised Mr. Holden of his 
intentions as to eon1pensation (R. 329-330). 
On recross-examination Mr. Beck admitted writing 
on March 13, 1943, that he was enclosing the bill requested 
by ~Ir. Holden and that "the fee for preparation of 
pleadings, etc., can \vait" and that on June 12, 19·44, he 
wrote ··I enclose a bill for payment in full of services on 
the Dutchman lawsuit" and after receiving the check, 
he wrote, "I acknowledge your check in full p·ayment of 
the compensation for services in the Golden West eject-
ment la,vsuit" and that he had never notified. Mr. Holden 
that this was anything other than pay1nent in full for 
that matter (R. 335). 
In addition to the n1atters abstracted hy the Appel-
lant at pages 24-25 of the Ap~pellant's brief Mr. Willard 
Cleghorn testified as follows: Mr. Beck was never taken 
into the mine by him and never went into the mine as 
far as he knows, but was told that once he went to the 
collar of the shaft in the main tunnel ( R. 345). After 
several failures of Mr. Beck to make changes in a pro-
posed lease as requested by him, he broke off negotia-
tions and the next year Mr. Holden agreed to the changes 
and he (Cleghorn) employed Frank Johnson to draw up 
the contract and that was the contract which was exe-
cuted with the Lessees and the Dutchman Company (R . 
• 
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348-349). l-Ie never discussed with ~Ir. Beck the opera-
tions of the mines under his direction, or the amount of 
royalties being paid, except in a general way and Mr. 
Beck was advised that ore was being shipped (R. 351). 
During the fall of 1945, Cleghorn did much actual physi-
cal work at the mine, and afterwards spent most of his 
tin1e 'vith the ad1ninistrative responsibilities but 'vas at 
the Inine ·probably 80% of the time. Beck called at his 
hon1e 8 or 10 tilnes, and they discussed the condition of 
the mine and \vhether ore was being mined (R .. 354). He 
knows of no complaint at anytime about the way the 
1nine was being operated by him (R. 356). 
In addition to the matters abstracted in Appellant's 
brief at pages 25-26, Mr. Alma Bourne testified as fol-
lows: Mr. Bourne hired Mr. Heist and paid him for 
his services in 1938, 39, 40 (R. 360). The RFC Loan for 
the Lessees was negotiated by him, with the assistance 
of Harvey IIeist and }fr. Beck did absolutely nothing 
on the Golden Westloan (R. 372). 
In addition to the testimony abstracted in Appellant's 
brief from pages 26-30, Mr. H. W. Holden testified as 
follows: In June 1924, he asked 1\Ir. Beck what it "~ould 
cost to complete patents on four claims and was told 
he could do it for $600 and the n1oney was paid itntnedi-
ately. An item of $30 paid to Mr. Beck at about the 
same time, he could not identify (R. 388). 1-le learned 
later that Senior and Senior were doing the patents 
'(R. 388). Following the 1937 meetings when the 20,000 
shares of stock were transferred to l\1 r. Beck the minutP 
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book \Vith these I~nutes in it were given to Mr. Beck 
\Yho read them and said nothing about the matter (R. 
396). l\fr. Beck at no tin1e had advised Mr. Holden the 
basis upon \Yhich he ,,~as to be paid for various aspects 
of legal work and has never advised him that he expected 
to be paid for other services on a basis different from 
that on services for which payment was made ( R. 398). 
~Ir. Holden at no time p:aid a salary to himself when 
there v;ere outstanding bills against the company and if 
:J1r. Beck had rendered a statement at any time his bill 
would have been paid before the salary (R. 400). 
Follovving the conservation in the fall of 1947, no 
authority was given to Mr. Beck to act for the Dutch-
nlan Con1pany in connection with Mr. Gottron (R. 409). 
Exhibit B, in the minute for February 10, 1941, 
refers to an item of $65.10 for office expenses, the 
minutes being signed by Mr. Holden and Mr. Beck. He 
does not remember whether that office expense was his 
or not (R. 440-441). 
A letter from Mr. Holden to Mr. Gottron dated July 
31, 1946 "(Exhibit XX) states "I would welcome any court 
action that you might wish to start, for to me you are 
only another small stockholder and you will receive the 
same consideration as the rest of the stockholders" (R. 
460). 
On August 4, 1948, Mr. Gottron concluded a letter 
with "was pleased with the information. contained in 
your letter and hope when you go to the mine you will 
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have good news. Sincerely yours, J. F. Gottron" (Exhibit 
18, R. 462). 
A letter in the same Exhibit dated March 2, 1949,. 
concludes with "Hope you are enjoying good health and 
a pleasant winter. \Tery truly yours, J. F. Gottron" (R. 
463) and on March 18, 1949, a letter from the same exhibit 
is an invitation to meet Mr. Holden in Utah, '~and go to 
the rnine with hjm" (R. 463). On July 11, 1949, a letter 
in the same exhibit refers to a meeting with Mr. Book 
in which Beck had told him of the check for $1,000 sent 
by l\1r. I-Iolden and that Beck expected to ask for $5,500 
and says: "Have no idea whether :rvfr. Beck has rendered 
a bill but at least the amount mentioned was an indica-
tion of \vhat will be asked and certainly could be no more" 
and concludes with: "Hope this finds you in good health 
and that the hot weather we have had has not bothered 
you on the West coast" (R. 463). 
On November 10, 1950, in a letter from the same 
Exhibit, l\fr. Gottron 'vrote that Clarence Beck had been 
in Chicago for several weeks, but he had been unable 
to see him. 
Mrs. Holden's testimony was not referred to in 
Appellant's brief. In her short testimony was included 
a recital of the conversation in the Hotel Utah Coffee 
Shop in October or early November of 1947, when l\1r. 
Holden said to Mr. Beck: "Mr. Beck you got my letter, 
we want nothing more to do with you and your office in 
regard to the Dutchman. You know that is what I told 
you in the letter. I have nothing to go to your office for" 
(R. 469-470). 
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Exhibit 20 also received 1n evidence, consisted of 
documents produced by the Plaintiff frorn his files in 
response to a demand and containing correspondence 
with Mr. Gottron (R. 472). Excerpts from some of these 
letters are as follo,vs : 
Beck to Gottron, February 10, 1948: ' 4Dear Gottron: 
*** The annual financial statement of course is out. I 
have not seen it. I guess I am in the dog house, but will 
try to get a copy. You of course as a stockholder are 
entitled to it. It will have in detail all of the information 
you spoke of" ( R. 4 72) . 
Gottron to Beck,· January 20, 1949 : "Dear Clarence· 
*** Just wondered if you knew anything that might be 
of interest regarding the Dutchman. Heard indireetly 
from Bill Childs that you were no longer acting as 
attorney for the company and would enjoy hearing from 
you at your convenience" (R. 473). 
Beck to Gottron, February 1, . 1949: . "Is there any 
evidence that I am to bring suit~ Is this a passing fancy, 
or a fancy pass from the company~ I seem to be groping 
in a factual vacuum. If I am to bring suit I want to get 
busy, but it occurs to me that this would be perhaps the 
last thing the management vvould want, and for very 
obvious reasons" (R. 473). 
Gottron to Beck, F·ebruary 10, 1949: "As I told you, 
I have a complete file and much of it, I believe, will be 
of interest to you" (R. 473). 
Gottron to Beck, March 18, 1949 : "Believe the infor-
lnation I have at Chicago would be of benefit and our 
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getting together might prove valuable to both of us'' (R .. 
474). 
Beck to Gottron, April 23, 1949: "Dear Jack, It was 
my intention to see you on n1y return last trip, but con-
nections simply would not permit. I have planned to be 
· in Chicago all of Wednesday of next week, that is to say, 
April 27th. A substantial part of the day I 'viii be in 
the elear with nothing to do, and will telephone you at 
first opportunity" (R. 475). 
Gottron to Beck, September 22, 1949 : "Would be 
glad to hear fro1n you, as shortly, I propose to do some-
thing that may change Holden's attitude. I 'vanted to 
come to Salt Lake before going into the matter but no'v 
have decided to employ legal talent in Los Angeles, and 
some auditors, and then determine how the Dutch1nan 
was set up originally, how Holden can issue stock with-
out notifying the stockholders and many other things 
that might embarrass him" (R. 475). 
Gottron to Beek, Oetober 5, 1949 : "Dear Clarence: 
Received a copy of your letter written Mr. Holden, and 
while I am not familiar with all you have done for the 
Dutchman, it seems to me the bill for thirty year's serv-
ice is reasonable. There is so1nething about the Inanage-
ment of the Dutchman :by Holden that deserves investi-
gation, and I hope if Holden does not treat you as he 
should, that you will join forces with me in trying to 
see that the stockholders are given the consideration they 
are entitled to because of 1noney invested. • • • Would 
like your advice as to how to go about this, as, as soon 
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as I haYe the information, expect to start action against 
Holden" (R. -!75-476). 
Beck to Gottron, ~larch 2-l:, 1952: '"Dear Jack: The 
last times I \Yas through Chicago I 'vas unable to reach 
yon over the telephone *** I have decided to file my suit 
today, and of course, this will undoubtedly require a 
great amount of accounting on Harry's part. I should 
like to get your view in the premises. I have nothing 
East requiring any time in the near future, except at 
Cleveland, and it is doubtful that I will stop at Chicago''" 
(R. 478). 
Gottro nto Beck, l\Iarch 31, 1952: "Dear Clarence: 
Thanks for your letter of the 24th and I am glad to 
kno'v you are going to start action as Holden has had 
everything his way for too long a time and I hope you 
give him the trimming of his life." 
'"At present an old friend of mine introduced me· to 
an attorney who recovered quite a sizable amount for a 
deal ahnost like Holden and the Dutchn1an, he has exam-
ined my papers and is willing to take Holden into Court, 
if I \vill give him a 25% interest in 1ny holdings in the 
mine. Before doing so I 'vould like your ideas as I have 
never been involved in a court action in my life and had 
hoped I never would be, but this Holden attitude has 
almost got me and I think he should get what he 
deserves." 
"Let me know what you have done and if you will 
tell me how you think I should act under the circum-
staners it would he appreciated. Hope this finds you well 
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and that 've may get together before too long" (R. 478-
479). 
Mr. Beck was called as a rebuttal witness and 'vas 
asked this question, "The conversations you had 'vith 
Mr. Gottron 'vere 'vi th the idea of getting this diffieul ty 
adjusted between l\fr. I-Iolden and 1\tlr. Gottron ?" (R. 
482), and answered in part as follows : "He would say 
to me, 'When are we going to get this guy Holden out of 
this,' and he would say, 'vVhen are you going to do son1e-
thing~', and then he said he 'vas playing both ends 
against the middle, ***" (R. 483), and when asked about 
the mutual or combined interests referred to in son1e of 
the Gottron letters, Beck answered, "Gottron wanted to 
be on the Board of Directors and he wanted a dividend. 
He thought that was n1utual to me. Holden was my boss 
and I was trying to serve him and had given Holden the 
best I had in me, my whole life" (R. 488). 
After both parties had rested counsel met 'vi th the 
Court in Chambers, which does not appear in the reeord 
but is indicated by the staten1ent at R. 491 that the jury 
was excused and by the stipulation there referred to, 
'vhich indicates that there had been a discussion by the 
Court and counsel and the Court said "Is that a correct 
statement of your agreement, gentlemen~" ( R. 491 ) . 
The special verdict as given and returned by the 
jury was as follows: 
GROUP NO. 1: 
(a) What is the reasonable value of all of 
the non gratuitous services, legal and 
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otherwise, eompleted by the Plaintiff for 
the defendant, and at the request of the 
defendant, or in such 1nanner as to be 
reasonable within the request of the 
defendant, or of such nature as to bene-
fit the defendant, or services recognized 
or aeknowledged or ratified by the de-
fendant, for which the Plaintiff has not 
been paid in each of the following per-
iods: 
After July 31, 1921, and be-
fore November 1, 1947 __________ $1,100.00 
After October 31, 194 7 and 
before March 25, 1948____________ 300.00 
After March 24, 1948 and 
before March 25, 1952____________ 100.00 
Total -------------------------------- $1,500.00 
Your total cannot ex-
ceed $10,000.00. 
, Place a cross on the line at the end of each 
proposition hereinafter submitted to you that you 
adopt as your verdict and find to be true under 
the instructions submitted herewith: 
GROUP NO. 2: 
(a) The last work that the plaintiff Mr. 
Beck did, non-gratuitiously, for the de-
fendant company, that was reasonably 
within the request of the defendant .com-
pany, or Mr. Holden, was finished before 
March 25, 1948. 
No 
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(b) The last work that the plaintiff, Jir. 
Beck, did non-gratutiously, for the de.:. 
fendant company that was reasonably 
within the. request of the defendant com-
pany, or Mr. I-Iolden, was finished later 
than 1\iarch 24, 1948. 
X 
GROUP NO.3: 
( a) The plaintiff and the defendant intended 
that the individual items of account be-
tween then1 for services rendered by nir. 
Beck should not be considered independ-
ently, but should be considered as a con-
tinuatio:q of a related series, and that 
the a:ccoun t should be subject to a shift-
ing balance as additional, related serv-
ices were to be rendered, and as pay-
ments were to be made thereon. 
(b) The plaintiff and defendant intended 
that the individual items of the account 
between them for services rendered hy 
Mr. Beck, should be considered inde-
pendently and not as a continuation of 
a related series, and that the defendant 
would owe the plaintiff for each iten1 of 
service performed, and not for a bal-
ance on all of the said services together. 
X 
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GROUP NO.4: 
(a) The defendant company terminated the 
service of the plaintiff in 1947. 
('b) The defendant company did not termi-
nate the services of the plaintiff in 1947. 
X 
GROUP NO. 5: 
( 1) By a preponderance of the evidence was 
there an agreement that was never 
modified to the effect that the p~laintiff 
-vvould rendered general services for the 
defendant corporation for which he 
would be paid upon the happening of a 
contingency or a particular event~ 
Yes 
If you have answered "No" to the above, ques-
tion, do not answer the balance of the questions in 
this group. If you have answe-red "yes" to the 
above question, then answer the following ques-
tion: 
( 2) By a preponderance of the evidence 
state by -vvhat date, if any, the contin-
gency or p·articular event had occured. 
Se·pt. 11, 194 7 
(State a date or year, or 
write "None proven.") 
Exhibit #6 
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If you have not stated a date on the foregoing 
question do not ans\ver the remaining question in 
this group. If you have stated a date, then ans\ver 
the following question: 
( 3) By a preponderance of the evidence by 
what date, if any, did the plaintiff kno"· 
or should he have known, that the con-
tingency or event had occured ~ 
Sept. 11, 1947 
(State a date or year, or 
write "None proven.") 
/s/ LaMar E. Peterson F·OR.E~1AN 
(R. 19-21) 
And the supplemental special verdict as given and 
returned was ; 
GROUP NO. 6: 
(1) When you decided in Group No. 1 that 
$1500 had been earned by the plaintiff 
and was unpaid, was the $1000 repre-
sented by a check in this case, earned 
and to be paid in addition to the $1500. 
No 
Answer "yes" or "No'~ 
If you have answered the foregoing question 
"Yes" then answer the following: 
(2) In which of the three period referred to 
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in Group No. 1 was the $1000. repre-
sented by said check, earned~ 
(Insert one of the three periods 
listed in Group 1, by citing 
the dates.) 
/s/ LaMar E·. Peterson F'O·REMAN 
(R. 22) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
All of the points stated by Respondent and Cross-
Appellant in its Cross-Ap,peal are covered by or involved 
in the points of argument as stated by the Appellant at 
pages 31 and 32. It app·ears that the six points in the 
Statement of Points on Cross-Appeal (R. 51-52) are thus 
covered: App·ellant's point 2 covers our points 1, 3, 4, 
and 5; Appellant's point 3 covers our points 2 and 5; 
and Appellant's point 4 covers our point 6. 
The purpose of the Cross-Appeal is to correct the 
error of the district. court in entering judgment for 
$1,500.00 after the jury had found in its special verdict 
that the value of the unpaid services prior to November 
1, 1947, was $1,100.00, the value of Plaintiff's services 
from October 31, 1947, to March 24, 1948, was $300.00, 
and the value of services after March 24, 1948, was 
$100.00 (R. 19) and also found that it was the intention 
of the parties that the individual items of the account 
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for services rendered by the Appellant should be con-
sidered independently and that Defendant owned Plain-
tiff for each ite1n of service as it was complete (R. 20) 
and also found that there was an agreement to pay upon 
the happening of a contingency and that the contingency 
occured on September 11, 1947 (R. 21). 
We shall, therefore, discuss Appellant's points in 
the order stated by Appellant and show how the correct 
decision of these points requires entry of a judgn1ent 
for $100.00 on the special verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY THAT THE BURDEN WAS ON THE 
DEFENDANT TO SHO\V BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN PAID TO 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR HIS SERVICES AS REQUESTED 
IN PARAGRAPH TWO OF HIS REQUESTS (R. 23-24). 
The Appellant's request No. 2 (R. 23) 'vas correctly 
refused as being a meaningless request. It was n1eaning-
less because although it referred to the preponderan<'r 
of the evidence, there was no request for an instrn('tion 
to indicate where the burden of proof lay in determining 
the amount paid for legal services. 
The instruction as to burden of proof on the special 
verdict was No. 2A of the instructions : 
"The plaintiff has the burden of proving the 
amounts that you fill in for each lin0 of n roup 1. 
If a preponderance of the evidenre flop~ not show 
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any amount for a particular line, write in 'none'," 
(R. 25). 
It will he noted that the questions known as Group 
1 were rewritten in conference in the court's chambers, 
and that although the defendant had requested several 
interrogatories as to the items finally making up Group 
1 the court suggested that a single question could cover 
the entire series of transactions. To this the plaintiff 
made no objection, and the defendant made no formal 
objection and in effect both parties acquiesced in the 
court's approach to this proble1n, and it was considered 
to be generally the amount owing as to which the plaintiff 
had the burden of proof. 
Exceptions of the plaintiff to the instructions of 
the jury were taken after the jury had retired by agree-
Inent of the parties. A transcript of these proceedings 
shows the following: . 
"THE COlTRT: Let the record show the 
Jury has retired and counsel may take their 
exceptions. 
"JUDGE HANSON: Comes now the plain-
tiff and directs and excepts to the giving of the 
Instruction No. 29, (should be 2A) and to the 
whole thereof, 2-b and the whole thereof, and to 
the submitting to the jury of Instructions-strike 
that, Proposed Finding No. 2, 'for the reason and 
upon the ground that in this case ·the evidence 
shows as a matter of law, that the claim here sued 
upon is not barred by the Statute of Limitations, 
because of the following reasons:'" (R .. 49'2). 
In this state1nent there was no reference to the matter 
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of burden of proof or preponderance of the evidence, 
and there is none in the balance of the exceptions. 
No objection was made or exception taken to the 
failure to give Appellant's request No. 2, and the request 
itself does not suggest that defendant had this burden. 
The rnatter of burden of proof on the 1na tter of paYJ.nent 
just was not brought to the court's attention. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides: 
"No party n1ay assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he objeet~ 
thereto." 
This· clause under the federal decisions interpreting the 
comparable Federal rule would preclude plaintiff fron1 
arguing erroneous instructions on this point. However~ 
the Utah Rule adds a clause not found in the Federal 
rule which is: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing require1nent 
the appellate court in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may revie'v the giving or 
failure to give an instruction." 
. The Respondent's position is that since the instruc-
tions here were formulated in the court's chambers with 
the acquiescence of both parties neither party should be 
allowed to claim as error the giving of instructions as 
framed since no objection thereto was made and the 
court had no opportunity to modify the instrurtions to 
meet sueh objections. 
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Befor~ the pro1nulgation of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure there 'vas authority that without any requests 
for instructions a party can challenge on appeal the 
giving of erroneous instructions. This rule is stated in 
Sutton vs. Otis Eleva.tor Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437, and 
is based on subdivision (--!) of 104-24-14, U. C. A. 1943, 
\vhich provides in part: 
""vVhen the evidence is concluded the court 
shall instruct the jury in writing upon the law 
applicable to the case * *." 
The court held that this rule requires correct instruction&. 
on any question covered regardless of requests. But this 
provision was omitted from Rule 51 and has not been the 
la'v of l 1 tah since January 1, 1950. 
Furthermore, a further analysis of the facts involved 
casts some duobt on the correctness of the proposition 
that ~he defendant had the burden of proving payment, 
and makes the likelihood of error by the jury extremely 
remote, if not impossible. 
The rule as to burden of proof upon which Appel-
lant relies is limited to the situation where full payment 
is claimed by the debtor so that the entire cause of action 
of the creditor is defeated. In our case Respondent 
claims that several partial payments were made, that 
several items were paid in full, and that there was a pay-
lnent in full up to May, 1937, when stock was transferred. 
As to a debt 20 years old or more, there is a presumption 
of paYJnent without any evidence, and the creditor has 
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the burden of proof of non-payment as to such an 
account. 40 Am. Jur. 876 and 881. And part of the 
account here was of such age. 
Furthermore, the Appellant admitted that he 
received $600 for patenting claims, received all the pay-
ments which he requested for the handling of the Golden 
West ouster suit, including payment pursuant to a state-
nlent \Vhich \vas entitled "for services in full on Golden 
West Suit" (Exhibit 3). Beck admitted that he received 
the stock in 1937 and that he paid nothing for it, and that 
it \Vas rec~ived on account and not as a gift (R. 288), 
and adn1itted generally that the records of l\Ir. llolden 
showing payments to the plaintiff were accurate, and 
that the plaintiff had no records (R .. 273-37{). 1'his 
1neans that there was no issue as to payments n1ade and 
no issue as to the value of payments unless there was an· 
issue as to the value of stock given in 1937. 
As to the stock, Beck contends it was a part pay-
lnent, and the defendant contends it was payment in full 
to date. There is a presumption that such a tranBfer 
was a paJlnent on account and not a gift (In re Will;not, 
211 Iowa 34, 230 N. E. 330, 71 A. L. R. 1018) and any 
payment made is presumed to be a payment in full unless 
the contrary appears (70 C.J.S. 314). Mr. Beck takes 
the position that the stock was received as a pay1nent 
on account although intended as a payment in full to 
date, and the burden of proving the particular applica-
tion of that payment is on the person who n1ade the 
application (70 C.J.S. 303). 
But beyond all this, there is no dispute in thiH casr 
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:.as to the. receipt of payments. Since B·eck acknowledgetl 
. receipt of the stock in 1937, there is: no issue on it as to 
.receipt, and the jury· was free to, find,. and possibly did 
find that th~ stock .was received ·on, account .. The ;jury';s 
only probl-em \Yas to place a value on, the .. stock:~and. there 
-,vas no burden of, proof as to value. :Furtherm·or·e,,there 
·\vas no evidence. as~ to Yalue except~ the ·evidence of ··Mr. 
B-eck that the stock,was worth 1 ·cent.a share (R. 290), 
. and pres tunably the jury placed that .value on i it if it 
found that it 'vas a part payment only. 
It UlUSt. also be borne in mind that if Re-spo:ro.tlent 
·is correct on the law of th~ Statute of Limitations· as 
applied in this, ease, then. ·all of. the . Appellant's causes 
·of action prior to .11arch .2o, :1948, ·are· barred· and.:since 
:all pa-yments made by!the Respondent-were made prior 
to that date the inquiry into the matter vf payment: and 
-:the burden of proof thereon· would be academic. 
It thus app~ears th-at the Respondent did not·; have 
the burden of. proof. as to any contest-eo m'atters of pay-
·n1ent. ·Beck ·had the burden of proVing ·that any·pay-
1 ments made and ·acknowledged by him ·were partial 
payments 'as against the contention of the_ defendant 
that certain payments , \vere payments ·in full for par-
:ticular· ite1ns or pay1nents to date. See 70 C. J. S:3.39:·antl 
Wealtley v. }Jfizell, 193 Ill. App. '494. Since there .was no 
·issue on any other iten1s, ·it -vvas p-roper for the court to 
: giv·e instruction that the burden of proof was on the 
Appellant to show the· amount owing, ·after giving credit 
·to the Respondent for ·payn1ents which 'the Respondent 
:had made and.which the Appellant-acknowledged receiv-
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ing. The Appellant had the burden of proving that the 
payment of $600 for patenting in 1924, of the 20,000 
shares of stock in 1937 and for the Golden West suit 
in 19·44 in full did not amount to payment in full for 
those items and up to 1937. There was no error in the 
instruction given and certainly no error as a practical 
1na.tter or in a.ny way "\vhich could be considered to have 
prejudiced the jury or amount to error in the pro-
ceedings . 
.. A_ppellant argues that the pres-umption of payment 
disappears "where there is evidence touching a fact in 
controversy" (Page 35) and cites State v. Green, 78 Utah 
58, 6 Pac. 2nd 177, and In re Newell's E sta,te, 78 Utah 463. 
Appellant either 1nisconceives or mis-states the rule. 
The presumption does not disappear until there is evi-
dence contrary to the presumption propertly received 
and such is the holding of the two Utah cases. In one, 
the presumption of sanity was rebutted by evidence of 
insanity and in the other the presumption of uninten-
tional omission fron1 a will was rebutted by evidence 
that the omission was intentional. In the case at bar, 
the only evidence as to payment was evidence that pay-
ments were 1nade. Both parties testified to the payn1ent 
of money for the by-laws and minutes (R. 275 and 381), 
and patenting work (R. 275 and 388); Holden testified 
that the stock was in payment of all services up to 1937 
( R. 390-396), and Beck admitted receipt of the stock and 
that it was payment on account (R. 288, 289), and both 
testified to· payments of $100, $225, and $375 in paytnent 
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of services in the Golden West E.jectment suit (R. 280, 
273, 397) and Beck admitted a long list of other pay-
ments (Exhibit 12, Answer to Interrogatory No. 6), and 
stated that the most reliable evidence was to be found 
in Mr. Holden's books (R. 273). Beck made no demand 
for pay1nent and rendered no statement for services 
rendered which "\Yas not paid imn1ediately until the final 
demand of September 20, 1949 (R. 256). 
Appellant's statement "that it is prejudicial error 
to place the burden of proof on the wrong party" has 
no application to this case. 
The statement is entirely too broad and the authori-
ties cited by Appellant, if followed, would require the 
Court to hold in the case at bar that no prejudicial error 
was comn1itted. Appellant cites the following four case·s: 
Hillyard vs. Ba.ir, 47 Utah 561, 155 Pac. 449, where 
the Court held it was prejudicial error to give instruc-
tions on a question not in issue. There \vas no decision 
on whether the instruction of burden of proof was 
prejudicial error, the ··Court saying that this question 
"was not excepted to nor is it assigned as error; hence, 
it is not before us for review." 
Whipple vs. Preece, et al, 18 Utah 454. That case 
involved conversion of property in which the Defendant 
set up an affirmative defense and made a written request 
for instructions to the jury on the burden of proof .. The 
court refused the request and gave no instructions on 
burden of proof as to the affirmative matter. Under 
these circumstances the Court held very properly that 
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:.the jury ·might have been misled saying: "lTnder the 
pleadings, the Court ought .to have instructed the jury 
of .its own,motion .that,.as to the.affirmative matter set 
up in the answer, the burden of proof was .upon the 
defense, and.having .failed to do this, .that .Plaintiff was 
entitled to have his reque-st given to the jury, ·without 
any words of refusal on it." But the Appellant has not 
brought himself within this case since there is no real 
issue on. the matter of pf:tyn1ent, there \vas no written 
request. on the burden of proof, there ,was no. exception 
taken to the refusal of the Court to instruct, and S-ection 
104-24-14 (4) U:· C. A. 1943, under which this Court has 
.held that . correct :instructions 1nust be . given without 
request from the parties, has been r~pealed and there 
is no longer any such requirement. 
Dimnick v. Uta.h Fuel Cornpany, :49 Utah '430, 164 
.Pac. 872. This case is dead against the Appellant. It 
. holds that the instruction on burden of proof was not 
so erroneous as to have· misled the jury. and the judg-
, ment ·.was affirmed, the Court . stating: "Appellant's 
counsel in their brief, contend that the instruction waB 
erroneous and prejudicial in other particulars, but "re 
!find no. exceptions were taken in th·e Court below to such 
other portions of the in-structions now complained of, and 
therefore this Court cannot here. for the first. tin1e con-
sider them as grounds for reversal." 
In Re HO!Y/Json's Will, 50 Utah 206, :167 Pac. 256. In 
this :case an. instruction on. undue influence in making a 
will was given to·the ·jury, and the Supreme Court found 
that there .was no evidence to support it. The Court 
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found also that it was error not to make a charge on the 
burden of proof as to undue influence, even though no 
request was made. The Court indicated that this case 
was exceptional in that the failure to charge on burden 
of proof "'"a~ prejudicial error, whereas ordinarily, it 
'vould not be, thus discussing the point: "While we do 
not desire to be understood as holding that it would be 
error under all circumstances to omit to charge upon the 
question of budren of proof, yet, in view of the peculiar 
circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the 
C.ourt erred in failing to instruct the jury upon the 
question of burden of proof on the issue of undue influ-
ence ***." 
APPELLANT'S POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE 
JURY THE PROPOSITION CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION 
2 FOR THE REASON THAT AS A MATTER O·F LAW THE 
CLAIM SUED UPON IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS (R. 25 and Tr. 492). 
Appellant's argun1ent on this point is under four 
headings: First, no cause of action arose until Appel-
lant made demand for payment; Second, Personal serv-
ice of smn1nons was not obtainable for a sufficient time 
to bar the action; Third, Respondent acknowledged 
existence of the obligation within four years; F:ourth, 
the 1naintenance of the company office kept the action 
alive. 
'V e shall first answer these four facets of Appel-
lant's argument and then state why Respondent believes 
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that the Statute of Limitations was a real issue and 
properly submitted to the jury. 
First, Appellant made no demand. The authorities 
cited by Appellant at pages 39 and 40 of his brief are 
inapplicable. The case cited by Appellant, Wilson vs. 
lVeber County, 100 Utah 141, 11 Pac. 2d 147, holds that 
no demand was necessary to start the running of the 
Statute of Limitations for an action to recover a filing 
fee under a void statute. The quotation from the case 
simply indicates that it is possible to have a situation 
where a demand is a condition precedent. Appellant 
points to nothing in this case by agree1nent of the parties 
or implied from their conduct \vhich make a demand a 
condition precedent. 
And in any event, the making of a demand by the 
Appellant was obviated when the Respondent asked for 
a statement. This was made in the summer of 1946, and 
the jury found that such request was made by the 
Respondent at a time when the Respondent was able to 
pay, namely, September 11, 194 7 (R. 21). 
Second, personal service was not obtainable on thP 
Respondent corporation for the preceding four year 
period. It is conceded by the Appellant that the Respond-
corporation was not absent from the State. ln the trial 
Court, Appellant was inconsistent. He argued that the 
Respondent was absent from the state within the mean-
ing of 104-2-36, U. C. A. 1943, (now 78-12-35, tT. C. A. 
1953) and then argued that there was no basis for attach-
ment because the Respondent was not absent from the 
state. 
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Appellant is a little tnore cautious in his brief before 
this court but still cannot avoid the inconsistency. Appel-
lant argues that there was no basis for attachment, 
because Respondent \vas not concealing itself, and avoids 
meeting the argument of absence from the state hy ignor-
ing that basis for attach1nent (App,ellant's brief, page 
45). Appellant then argues that the corporation was in 
law a resident of the State, and therefore, not absent 
even though all of its officers weTe absent {Appellant's 
brief, page 46) . 
The corporation was either absent from the state 
or present within the state in contemplation of law. If 
absent, jurisdiction could have been obtained by an 
attachment and Appellant therefore had a remedy and 
a practical means of pressing his action. If the Respond-
ent vvas not absent fron1 the state, then the provisions of 
78-12-35, lT. C . .~..\. 1953, \Vere not applicable, the Statute 
of Limitations was not tolled, and the Appellant's argu-
ment amount.s only to a statement of reasons why the 
statute should be amended to provide for tolling of the 
Statute of Li1nitations vvhen a Plaintiff has no practicable 
remedy rather than li1nit it to absence from the state. 
The two questions involved in this point are entirely 
separable: We have argued that there was a practicable 
remedy in an effort to shovv the reasonableness of the 
Statute; regardless of the reasonableness of the Statute, 
thr Appellant must come within its tenns to prevent the 
running of the Statute. 
Appellant points to U. C. A. 19'43, Section 102-5-
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11 (5) (Brief page 41). This statute directs that service 
of summons may be made upon the Secretary of a 
domestic corporation and if such cannot be found, then 
upon a director. Beck was both the Secretary and a 
director. He then argues that he could not serve himself 
and therefore, this provision could not be followed. We 
again suggest that Beck was in frequent touch with 
Mr. Holden and could have had himself served and 
advised Mr. Holden of it in an effort to compel an 
appearance, or Mr. Beck could have commenced an attach-
ment proceeding, or he could have asked Mr. Holden 
whether he would make an appearance, or he could have 
obtained service by publication. 
Section 104-5-12, U. C. A. 1943, provides for service 
of sun1mons by publication pursuant to order of court 
"where the defendant is a corporation having no officer 
or other agent upon which summons can be served with-
in this state." It provides in Section 104-5-13 that copies 
of the summons and co1nplaint must be mailed to the 
defendant where the address is known. Since Mr. Bec.k 
testified about nmnerous visits with Mr. I-Iolden in Lo~ 
Angeles, and since he was charged with 1nailing notire~ 
of 1neetings to the directors there can be no question 
that Mr. Beck knew the addresses of Mr. Holden and 
other officers. 
The annotation at 126 A. I •. R. 1474 and especially 
149·4 to 1497 makes plain the validity of this type of 
service of process on a domestic corporation and that thP 
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result is personal jurisdiction of the domestic corpora-
tion. 
This 1natter is carried into the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as Rule 4 (f) ( 1). 
Furthermore, the absence of officers of a domestic 
corporation does not make the corporation absent from 
the state. 
••A domestic corporation, created by the laws 
of the state of the forum, must be treated as a 
citizen of that state, and the absence of its offi-
cers is not necessarily such aJbsence of the corpo-
ration as will toll the statute of limitations." 55 
C.J.S. 238. 
Cited in support of this statement are Shermam vs. 
Buffalo Bayou, B. & C. R. Co., 21 Tex. 349, upon which 
the Appellant comn1ents at page 50 of his brief. We 
believe the case supports our position and not the posi-
tion of the Appellant. The other case cited in the supple-
Inental annotations is Heitnzelman vs. Union News Com-
pa.rvy, 76 N. Y. S. 2nd 496. 
The Appellant's reference to Sherman vs. Buffalo 
Bayou mentions a corporation 'vhich maintains an office 
as not being beyond the state. It should be born in mind 
that under the facts of this case plaintiff contends that 
the office of the corporation was in Mr. Beck's office at 
all times until the cornmencement of action and he 
sought compensation in this case for use of his office as 
a service to the corporation. This being true the corpora-
tion at all times had an office and the argument that the 
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corporation was abs:ent from the state because· it had 
no officers or agents in the state would seem to fall of 
necessity. The Appellant's position then is, not that the 
corporation had no office in the state, but that the corpO-
ration had no officer within the state except the plaintiff 
who now contends he was not able to serve the corpora-
,. ' 
tion by serving himself. This argument has no appli~-
tion to Section 104-2-36, U. C. A. 1943 which deals 'vith 
aJbsence from the state, and if the argument has any 
validity it would have to be under 104-2-37 U. c:; A. 1943, 
which deals with disability of the plaintiff. This is 
because there was an officer of the corporation in the 
state at all times and service could have been made 
under Section 104-5-11 a.t any ti1ne by anyone other than 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff says that he could not serYe 
himself, but this is not one of the disabilities which tolls 
the statute of hnitations under the section on disablity. 
No special rule is made for the plaintiff and nowhere is 
there any rule under the statute of limitations which 
says that where the defendant corporation is present 
within the state and any person except the plaintiff 
could file an action, the statute of limitations is tolled 
as to the plaintiff. 
Appellant states on page 49 that a corporation" ha~ 
no existence independent of its stockholders and officers" 
without citing any authority to that end. The authorities 
cited by us hold that a domestic corporation is present 
in its state of creation at all times. Appellant's argument 
that this results in a hardship to him should not be heard, 
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because Appellant made absolutely no effort to com-
mence an action against the Respondent corporation until 
March 25, 1952. 
Third, there 1oas an acknowledgement of the claim 
sued on. 
Exhibit 3A offered to pay the plaintiff $1,000 and 
refers to an earlier request that the amount owing .he 
fixed so that the defendant could pay it. 
It must be born in mind that the account here was 
not liquidated and th~ endeavor of the defendant was to 
find out how much the plaintiff was claiming. If there 
was no dispute as to the amount owing, and the defend-
ant had offered $1,000, it would be easier to find the 
letter which is Exhibit 3A to be an acknowledgment of 
an existing debt and at the sa1ne time an offer to pay 
a part of the amount owing in satisfaction of the larger 
amount. No such intention is found in Exhibit 3A. 
Defendant acknowledged that son1ething was owing to 
the plaintiff and offered to pay $1,000 to satisfy the 
entire claim, without any indication that there would be 
or could be any additional amount owing by the defend-
ant to the plaintiff. vV e think that was an offer by the 
defendant to pay $1,000 for any clain1 the plaintiff might 
have against the defendant and that there was no 
acknowledgement beyond that. 34 Am. ~Jur. Sections 303, 
304 and 306 state the law generally but a careful reading 
of Exhibit 3A will have to control its interpretation. 
Appellant states that the lTtah cases make a distin~ 
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tion between an action or promise to pay after the 
Statute has run and the cases where the Statute has not 
run, and there is merely an acknowledgement (Brief 
page 51). 
34 Am. Jur., Limitations af actions, Section 293 
states: -
"The general -rule seems to be that there is 
no distinction between the legal effect of an action 
or payment made before or after the bar of the 
Statute of Limitations has attached, as in either 
case the effect is to subvert the principles or pre-
sumed payment on which in many states that 
Statute is deemed to be founded." 
In Section 294, the treatise goes on to distinguish 
between a promise made before and one made after the 
·statute has run, insofar as the creation of a new cause 
of action is concerned, indicating that it is generally 
held that after the Statute has run and the action is 
barred, 
"The acknowledg1nent or promise is therefore 
held to create a ne'v contract, giving the creditors 
a new cause of action." 
In support of this statement Attorney General vs. Pom-
eroy, 9·3 Utah 426, 73 Pac. 2nd 1277, 114 A. L. R. 726 i~ 
cited. This case indicates that there is no difference in 
the formality or degree or definiteness of the acknowl-
edgment in the two cases, but that there is a difffrenre 
in the theory of pleading the Statute of Limitations. The 
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case holds at page 755 of 114 A. L. R. that where the 
acknowledgment is made before the statute has run, the 
pleadings must be to that effect, and "if made after the 
Statute has run so as to revive the debt as against the 
statute, such aclmowledgment must be pleaded as a basis 
of the action." 
. Respondent adn1its that, under the special verdict, 
the Statute had not run at the tin1e Exhibit 3A was sent, 
but Respondent denies any such distinction as the unsup-
ported statement of Appellant attempts to make. The 
cases hold that an acknowledgment made prior to the 
time the Statute has run will be carefully scrutinized and 
there will be no implied acknowledgment of an entire 
debt beyond the specific acknowledgment in the docu-
ment. 
It must be remembered that in 1946 and 1947 Mr. 
Holden had den1anded a bill or statement from the Appel-
lant and in the fall of 1947 the Appellant asked for 
$2,000 on account which demand Mr. I-Iolden had refused, 
until he had a statement of the account (R. 386). 
Exhibit 3A is dated March 29, 1948, on the stationery 
of Dutchman Coalition Mine Company and reads as 
follows: 
"Mr. Clarence M. Beck 
416 Felt Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 
D·ear Clarence 
It has been nearly two years since I have been 
trying to get your bill for services on the Dutch-
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man Coalition Mines Co. this I have been unable 
to do, your many promises to submit it have never 
·been fulfilled. 
The Directors here feel that we should declare 
a small dividend but are reluctant to do so till all 
bill's are paid. 
We have gone over the work that you have 
done and the money we have paid you together 
with the Thirty Thousand shares of stock you 
received and feel that the enclosed check for OKE 
THOUSAND DOLLARS· is a very liberal one to 
compensate the payment for your services to this 
date. 
We will take it for granted that the cashing-
of this check constitutes your acceptance as pay-
ment in full for all services rendered" 
Sincerely 
Harry W. Holden/s/ 
President 
DUTCHMAN COALITION MINES CO." 
It is plain that this letter was an effort to compro-
mise and settle this claim at a price substantially less 
than the $2,000 Mr. Beck had demanded and that it \Va~ 
not a general acknowledgment of an account in an 
amount to be determined. 
The accompanying check for $1,000 had a typed 
endorsement: "Payment in full for all legal services to 
date." And so was likewise an offer and attempt to get 
this matter settled and paid for $1,000 and wa~ not an 
acknowledgment of an entire account. 
The authorities hold generally that sur.h a co1n-
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promise offer rnust be accepted to form a contract in 
settlement of a clairn and will not, alone, toll the Statute 
of Lin1itations and annotation at 12 A. L. R. 544 cites 
nwnerous cases but none from Utah either for or against 
this position. 
Fourth, the rna.intenance of the company's office in 
Clarence Beck's office was a continuous service and kep~t 
the cause of action alive. Appellant makes this state-
ment at page 36 of his brief but argues it only in his 
main Point Three. 
The answer to Interrogatory 3B in the special ver-
dict is a complete answer to this. This answer was that 
the individual ite1ns of the account became due as the 
services were perfor1ned and there is nothing about the 
use of an office which suggests that no action can be 
brought for such use until many years have elapsed. 
Appellant argues this matter under his Point Three, and 
'\Ve shall do likewise since on the face of it, the use of the 
office is an easier item to bar under the Statute of Limi-
tations than legal services generally, some of which may 
not he complete for 3 or 4 years after their commence-
ment. 
A'PPELLANT'S POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS TO ANSWER ITEM b OF GROUP 3 IN 
THAT THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHO·WS THAT 
THERE WAS A RUNNING ACCOUNT AND EACH ITEM 
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY (R. 20 and 
Tr. 493). 
Although Appellant refers in the statement of this 
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point to "a running account" the Statute describes it as 
"an open account." 
The question is whether the account of the Appellant 
here is "an open account for work, labor, or services 
rendered," as contemplated by the Statute. This seems 
to be answered by Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 134 
Pac. 2d 180, where this court was construing this same 
statute as applicable to a claim for services by an attor-
ney against a corporation and rendered over a period of 
some nine and one-half years. The court quoted from a 
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court in Spencer v. 
Sowers, 118 Kan. 259, 234 Pac. 972 at page 973, 39 A. L. 
R. 365, the following definition: 
"A mutual open, current account may be 
defined as an account usually and properly kept 
in writing wherein are set down by express or 
implied agreement of the parties concerned a con-
nected series of debit and credit entries of recipro-
cal charges and allowances, and where the parties 
intend that the· individual items of the accow1t 
shall not be considered independently, but as a 
continuation of related series, and that the account 
shall ~be kept open and subject to a shifting bal-
ance as additional related entries of debits or 
credits are made thereto, until it shall suit the 
convenience of either party to settle and close the 
account, and where pursuant to the original. 
express, or implied intention there is but one 
single and indivisible liability arising fro In such 
series of related and reciprocal debits and credits, 
which liability is to be fixed on the one part or 
the other as the balance shall indicate at the ti1ue 
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of settlement or following the last pertinent entry 
of the account." 
There just was no account kept between these 
parties. There was no "\vay for the Respondent to know 
what charges Mr. Beck intended to make, except as state-
ments were rendered. All statements were paid promptly 
and there was no underlying, continuing balance which 
was known to Respondent. 
It is of the essence of an open account that each 
party knows or can detennine at anytime what balance 
is owing and to whom it is owed. 
Interjection of the matter of the office rental does 
not alter the result. If Mr. Beck had ever indicated that 
he was charging for his office and that the charge was to 
be $1 per month or $2 per month, the Respondent could 
have computed the elapsed time and made the payment. 
There was never any assertion of a claim for use of 
office, not even with the filing of this action, until at the 
time of the pre-trial, the Appellant amended and included 
the phrase "'and other" so to make the action one for 
"legal an dother services" ( R. 10). 
In re Steur's estate, 77 Cal. App. 584, 247 Pac. 211, 
an action for board and room, and in re Porter's -estate, 
110 Pa Super 27, 167 at 490, a claim for office services 
are a complete answer to the contention of Appellant. 
In the face of the case of Bishop vs. Parker (supra), 
it is doubtful 'vhether Appellant here made a case to go 
to the jury. The answer of the jury in the special verdict 
that this was not a continuous account, but one calling 
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for payment of each item as co1npleted, fully answers 
the contention of Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUESTING THE 
JURY TO ANSWER QUESTION 2 OF GROUP 5 IN THAT 
IF MR. HOLDEN WAS PAID WHAT HE CLAIMED WAS 
OWING TO HIM THERE WOULD BE NO MONEY TO PAY 
PLAINTIFF (Tr. 493 and R. 21). 
·Group 5 was directed to the happening of a contin-
gency or a particular event which made Plaintiff's 
apparent claim for services payable. Under Question 2, 
of Group 5 the jury found that this event occured Sep-
tember 11, 1947. This was the date on which Mr. Holden 
wrote a letter, following up his previous efforts to get a 
statement out of the Appellant, in "\Vhich he stated that 
the bill must be presented and the claim paid that year 
(Exhibit 6, R. 300). 
Any argun1ent as to what claims had priority and 
whether there was enough money to pay Mr. Beck is 
superfluous in the face of the demand and this finding. 
On December 31, 1947, the Respondent had a cash balance 
of $13,688.49 (Exhibit 15), and presumably had that much 
on· September 11, 1947. This was more than enough to 
pay the claim of Mr. Beck stated to be the amount of 
$5,500.00 (Exhibit 3B and R. 219), and alleged with the 
usual margin for shrinkage during the trial at $10~000.00 
in the complaint (R. 1). 
But even if Appellant be indulged in his argument 
that it was not enough to pay Mr. Holden all he wanted 
and to pay Mr. Beck all he might claim, it was sperifically 
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stated by Mr. Holden that he "\vould not have drawn one 
penny of compensation until outstanding bills had been 
paid, and that if ~Ir. Beck had presented a bill that bill 
would have been paid before any salary was taken by 
himself ( R. 400). 
APPELL.ANT'S POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A NEW TRIAL (R. 45 and 48). 
This point was stated in the ~lotion for New Trial 
as point 4 (R. 45). ~fuch to the surprise of Respondent, 
there appeared in the record at pages 53 and 54, a memo-
randum signed by the trial judge ~'written at the request 
of counsel for the Plaintiff because the request made iby 
the Court referred to herein had not been preserved." 
There was no notice given to Respondent of any confer-
ence between the Plaintiff or his counsel and the Court 
on this matter and no notice that any such memorandum 
was to be included in the record. Respondent regards 
it as highly improper and as a document which should 
be stricken from the files. Respondent herewith and 
hereby moves that pages 53 and 54 of the record and 
also that all of point 5 of Appellant's argument be striken 
from the record. 
Realizing the latitude that both the district court 
and the Supreme Court have under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the spirit of those rules to permit a wide 
dis·cretion to both Courts, Respondent will proceed to 
argue Appellant's point Five without waiving the motion. 
Appellant argues at great lengths that the request 
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from the trial judge came too late. Respondent's view 
is that if Appellant were interested in that question, it 
should have- been argued in the trial court as suggested 
by the trial judge so as to give Respondent also an 
opportunity to reply and to satisfy the trial judge. 
Respondent admits that it would have objected to the 
timeliness of the argument, but was prepared to argue 
the point raised by the trial judge. The point does not 
appear difficult and having heard the parties, the Court 
would undoubtedly have adhered to its ruling denying 
the 1Yiotion for New Trial. 
Appellant has now placed himself in the position of 
raising a question before this Court for the first time 
and the Court should not hear it. The matter is material 
to the motion for new trial and should have been raised 
in the argument. 
The cases cited by Judge Jeppson are not applicable 
to the facts of this case, and if they were, the ans"Trr 
would be readily found in the cases cited by tludge Jep-
pson. And if there was any doubt at the time the Ineino-
randum was written and inserted gratutiously in this 
file, the uncertaini ty has been resolved by the recent 
case of Ladder vs. Western Pacific R. ro., Case No. 
7809. 
The difference in the two types of cases lies in the 
fact that where verdicts are excessive there has been a 
satisfaction of the right to trial 'by jury by getting jury 
approval for a large amount. The Plaintiff is given a 
clear choice of reduction of the verdict or a ne'v trial. 
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In our case, there has been no good reason to believe 
that any jury would clear any additional amount. A new 
trial under these circmnstances thus becomes an invita-
tion to a jury to go beyond an amount already found 
by a jury and gives nobody a right to accept a lesser or 
greater an1ount or go through the expense and worry of 
a new trial. The requisite degree of passion and preju-
dice to require a new trial are lacking, and there is no 
possible middle course of ''remit or suffer a new trial" 
consonant with passion and prejudice simply hinted at 
in the verdict. Appellant also notes this difference, 
(Brief, page 65-66). 
Let us inquire into the cases mentioned by Judge 
Jeppson and then consider whether the facts of this 
case suggest any prejudice whatsoever of the jury. 
The first of these cases was Pauly vs. 111 cC a,rthy 
(Utah 1947) 18-1- Pac. :2nd 123, at 126-127. In that case 
this Court "\Vas stating \·vhat it regarded as well estab-
lished principles of la"\v under the rules for granting new 
trials and observed that "mere excessiveness of a verdict 
\Vithout rnore does not, necessarily, show that the verdict 
was arrived at hy passion or prejudice" and noted that 
the Supre1ne Court could set aside the verdict and order 
a new trial where the verdict "\Vas "so excessive as to 
appear to have been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion 
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the motion 
for n~'v trial." The Court observed further that a new 
trial n1ust he granted where the facts show that as a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
matter of law the verdict was excessive or where it is 
"so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience.'' The 
Court held that the verdict in the Pauly case did not 
meet the latter test and that it was, therefore, proper for 
the court to order a new trial unless a substantial remis-
sion in the verdict was made. 
In Duffy vs. Union Pac. R. Co. (Utah 19·50) 218 
Pac. 2nd 1080, the trial Court had denied the motion for 
new trial and had not ordered a ren1ission of any portion 
of the verdict of $12,500 as reduced by the contributory 
negligence factor of $3,500. The Supreme Court held 
that it was within its power to direct a remittitur of 
$4,000 and to order a nevv trial if the Plaintiff did not 
accept the reduction. The Court affirmed the rule from 
the earlier cases that the grossly excessive verdict can, 
without other evidence, show passion and prejudice and 
require a remission of part of the verdict. There waR 
no discussion in this case of the difference between pas-
sion and prejudice which requires a remission of the 
verdict and the passion and prejudice which requires a 
complete new trial. 
All of the cases were revie\ved in Wheat rs. Dcnrer & 
R. G. W. R. Co. (Utah 1952) 250 Pac. 2nd 932. There the 
trial court had ordered a reduction of the verdict fron1 
$17,000 to $10,000 or else that the Defendant have a 
new trial and the Court concluded that this \Vas proper 
because "the verdict was not so suffused \Vi th passion and 
prejudice that the Defendant did not have a fair trial 
on the other issues." At page 935 the Court stated thr 
true rule to be 
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Hthat if the verdict is so excessive as to show that 
it must have been motivated by prejudice or ill 
will toward a litigant, or that passion such as 
anger, resentment, indignation, or some kindred 
emotion has so overcome or distorted the jury's 
reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful, or 
punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside." 
The cases '\Vere again reviewed by this Court in 
Lodder vs. Western Pacific R. Co., Case No. 7809, 
decided in July, 1953. The Court tabulated juries' ver-
dicts and the remissions approved by the Court giving 
the percentages of net verdicts constituting remissions 
and held that the verdicts did not require a new trial 
but that it was propertly denied conditioned upon a 
remission of part of the verdict. The Court said: 
'~But we find no case where this Court has 
held that as a matter of law passion and prejudice 
were shown n1erely by the excessive an1otmt of 
the verdict so we have not indicated how great an 
a1nount or percentage of reduction would be 
required to n1ake such a showing but we have 
approved reductions as high as 50 percent, and 
required a reduction of 70 percent of punitive 
damages or about 63 percent of the total verdict 
where there was no other evidence of passion and 
prejudice. The trial judge evidently concluded 
that the verdict 'vas not so tainted." 
Judge Jeppson did not correctly appraise these 
cases. He assun1es that new trials had been conditionally 
granted "without evidence of passion" and believe.d also 
that in the Wheat case a reduction was allowed without 
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the "existence of passion." He speculates that if a ver-
dict could be reduced or a new trial granted without the 
existence of passion then perhaps a new trial could be 
granted on the same sho,ving without any re1nission. 
The decisions of this Court plainly state that passion 
and prejudice must be found to have existed in all of the 
cases where verdicts were remitted under penalty of a 
new trial. The thing the ,Judge missed was that the 
Supreme Court has plainly recognized differences in 
degree of passion and prejudice and that a ne\r trial is 
compelled only when the entire verdict is tainted with 
passion, prejudice, or hostility. 
Judge Jeppson plainly held in his me1norandun1 that 
there was no evidence of passion or prejudice showing 
hostility or sufficient to taint the whole verdict; indeed, 
he indicates that there was no evidence of passion. HiR 
language was that "no evidence was pre sen ted of passion 
or prejudice, except as might be inferred fron1 the s1nall 
amount of the verdict" and then immediately he referred 
to the situation as one "without evidence of pa~sion.H 
Again we say, that an argument of this point beforr 
Judge Jeppson would probably have satisfied hitn that 
this was no place for a new trial. At the most, there was 
here such evidence of prejudice as to eall, in the railroad 
cases for conditional denial of a new trial, conditioned 
upon remitting part of the verdict. And where th<) Yerrlirt 
is deemed to be inadequate, this would require the denial 
of the new trial, for lack of intPnse pa~sion or prPjudir(l, 
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and there would be no middle ground for a conditional 
increase in the verdict because of denial of trial by jury .. 
But the Respondent does not concede that there is 
any evidence whatsoever of passion or prejudice even in 
a slight degree. It is quite reasonable that a lawyer on 
the bench would be Inore sympathetic with a large fee 
for a la,vyer, than '''"ould a non-lawyer jury. All lawyers 
must realize that 'vhen they go to court to collect their 
fees, they must subject themselves to the test of reason-
ableness before a non-lawyer jury. If Mr. Beck is willing 
to be dilatory in preparing his statement for his legal 
services, he must realize that the ultimate statement can 
be subjected to the scrutiny of a jury. Respondent asked 
for a jury trial, believing that it would be disadvanta-
geous to the Plaintiff as against determination of fees by 
a Judge. Perhaps Respondent's counsel is subject to 
criticism for subjecting a fello'v attorney's staten1ent for 
services to a jury. But before this Court could fairly 
indulge in any conjecture on that subject it would have 
to know the details of the offers and counter-proposals 
made by the parties in efforts to settle this matter before . 
suit was filed. 
Furtherinore, is it not a lawyer's duty to his client 
to ask for a jury trial when the subject matter of the 
case is such that a non-lawyer jury would probably hold 
the verdict down as against the judg1nent of this Court~ 
And regardless of the views of counsel in the matter, 
the Respondent itself elected to have a jury trial, insisted 
that the jury trial be not waived, and speculations as to 
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relations between attorneys are entirely beside the point. 
This verdict must be tested upon evidence presented 
and Respondent contends that the amount of the verdict 
was not inadequate but was fair and even generous under 
the circumstances. 
Mr. Beck asked for $5,500 in September, 1949 
(Exhibit 3B, R. 219), sued for $10,000 (R. 1) and had 
two lawyers testify as experts that the services rendered 
were worth $12,000 or more (R. 232 & 246) but these 
experts heard only Beck's direct testimony-they heard 
no cross examination or other testimony tending to prove 
that Beck had been paid in full for many parts of his 
services, .had received payments on account, had been 
paid in full up to a certain date in 1937, had never rend-
ered some of the services he testified to, and had been 
so chummy with Mr. Gottron, whom he claimed to haYfl 
dissuaded from bringing an action, that the jury 'vas 
fully justified in allowing only $100 for this latter iten1 
.and should have allowed nothing. 
Let us start with $12,000 as the reasonable value 
of all services rendered, as testified by Ben L. Rich. 
Then let us substract from that the a1nounts whirh the 
jury might reasonabl~ conclude had been paid for, werr 
not rendered, or were not compensable. 
Mr. Rich placed values on the following portions of 
Mr. Beck's services : 
Golden West 
ejectment suit ................ $1,000 to $1,500 (R .. 240) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
By-la,vs, minutes, 
incorporation ------------------ 500 to 750 (R. 240) 
Patenting four rlaims ________ 5,000 to 6,000 (R. 242) 
Dissuading Gottron 
from suing· ---------------------- 2,000 
Total minimum charges .. $8,500 
(R. 233) 
That would leave $3,500 for all other general services 
for the period of 1921 through 1947, as the general serv-
ices pretty well ceased in 1947. There was strong evi-
dence of payment in full to a date of 1937 (Exhibit B, 
pages 38 and 42, R. 396). That would be for 16% years 
and leave 10lj2 to the end of 1947. Applying this to 
$3,500, the unpaid balance for 10:y2 years was $94.60 per 
year or $993.30. The jury's finding of $1,100 for this 
item was therefore well within the evidence. And this 
deducts nothing for additional small payments made to 
Beck (Exhibit 12, Ans'\ver to Interrogatory 5 ). Neither 
does it deduct anything for numerous references in 
Beck's testimony to negotiations, trips to the mine, and 
meetings with Cleghorn and Bourne (R. 131, 147, 149, 
151-153, 161, 162, 170, 181, 183, 185, 186, 193, 197, 305) 
which Cleghorn and Bourne denied almost completely 
(R. 345,351,360,363,366,372). 
No other witness, including Beck, gave the jury any 
hasis for deter1nining the relative values of the services 
for \vhich Beck had apparently been paid in full but for 
which he was still seeking payment. 
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The jury could have taken Beck's own statement for 
services and reduced that. Beck asked for $5,500 (Exhibit 
3B) and told Gottron that that was his bill ( R. 463, 4 75-
476). Included in this were services in preparing originnl 
by-laws and minutes (R. 64, 66, 70, 73), for which he 
had been paid (R. 274-275, 380); services in patenting 
claims (R. 276 & 277) for which he was paid in full 
(R. 388); services in Golden West ejectment suit (R. 
~83) for which he had been paid in full by Beck's own 
acknowledgment (Exhibit 3); services in dealing with 
Gottron when actually Gottron and Beck had their heads 
together to combine forces against Respondent (Exhib~t 
20, R. 472-479); services to Combined Metals (R. 223, 
321), Willard Cleghorn (R. 326-327), Dutchman lessees 
(R. 329-330) where a conflict of loyalties was involved 
and where Beck had never indicated that he was plan-
ning to hold the Respondent (R. 324, 326-327, 329-330, 
335). And again the jury should have found payn1ent 
in full to the 1niddle of 1937, applied ratably to the gen-
eral services. Since Beck deigned not to break down 
his claim for services (R. 326, Exhibit 12, Answers to 
interrogatories 6 and 7 there is no workable basis in 
Beck's charges and the jury si1nply had to use its be-st 
judgment. 
Also, Mr. Rich testified that the prices charged hy 
Beck on separate iterns were referable to the halan<'t· of 
his services (R. 24·2-243) and the inexpertness of his 
services were reflected by Cleghorn ( R. 348-349) nnd 
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his lack of forthrightness in the Gottron correspondence 
(R. 272-479). 
On the eYidence 1n this case the jury could not 
reasonably have done n1uch differently as to amount 
unless it had blindly accepted Mr. Beck's testimony and 
closed its eyes to eYer~~thing else in the case, including 
the cross-examination of l\Ir. Beck. 
SlT~I~IARY _._\ND CONCLUSIONS 
The Appellant had a full and fair trial and obtained 
a proper verdict. The jury evidently applied to the 
testimony the only practica;ble method it had of crediting 
payments-the testimony of Mr. Rich on values of vari-
ous parts of the services. 
The difficult question in the case was the statute of 
Lin1itations, \vhich was adn1irably handled by the special 
verdict. The jury's answers resolve the issues and pro-
vide basis for a judgn1ent of either $100 (under the cross-
appeal) or $1,500 as entered by the court, depending on 
two questions of la,v. The jury found, and is supported 
by ample evidence, that the parties intended payment for 
each ite1n of service as a separate item, but that payment 
would not be due until a certain contingency which was 
ability to pay. This contingency arose on September 11, 
19-1-7 in Respondent's unequivocal written demand for 
a staten1ent so the bill could be paid. That means the 
statute of li1nitations con11nenced to run on September 11, 
1947. All prior service~~ and all services to March 24, 
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1948, were presumptively barred when the action was 
commenced March 25, 1952, except for the $100 earned 
after commencement of the action. 
Barred, that is, unless Appellant proved either an 
acknowledgment in the letter of March 29, 1948 (Exhibit 
3A) or that absence of all officers of the Respondent 
except the Appellant tolled the running of the statute. 
Exhibit 3A was an offer to compromise and, since 
unaccepted, did not revive or extend the statute. If this 
revived $1,000 of the obligation, then the verdict should 
be either $1,100 or $1,500 depending on the effect of 
absence of some officers of the corporation. 
Respondent's position is that absence of all officers 
of a resident corporation would not toll the statute and 
a fortiori presence in the state of Mr. Beck, the Secre-
tary and a Director, made section 78-12-35 U. C. A. 195:~ 
inapplicable. The Appellant claims he had no remedy. 
But Mr. Holden was anxious to get the matter settled 
and would have entered an appearance as he actually did 
without any service of summons, by answer filed within 
14 days and no preliminary pleadings (R. 3). Proceed-
ing by attachment (if the "absence" argument be sound) 
would have :been effective. And the statute plainly pro. 
vides for service by publication on a corporation with 
no officers or agents in the State. The plain truth is 
the Appellant didn't think about either servieP of sunl-
mons or the statute of limitations. 
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The motion for new trial should be denied~ The 
district court should be directed to reduce the judgment 
as this court resolves the questions of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD AND 
DAN S. BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Re:spondent 
and Cross Appellant. 
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